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Postponement and Rescheduling of Elections to
Federal Office
Summary
Because of the fear of possible terrorist attacks which could be directed at
election facilities or voters in the States just prior to or during the elections in a
presidential election year, attention has been directed at the possibility/authority to
postpone, cancel or reschedule an election for federal office.  The United States
Constitution does not provide in express language any  current authority for a federal
official or institution to “postpone” an election for federal office.  While the
Constitution does expressly devolve upon the States the primary authority to
administer within their respective jurisdictions elections for federal office, there
remains within the Constitution a residual and superceding authority in the Congress
over most aspects of congressional elections (Article I, Section 5, clause 1), and an
express authority in Congress over at least the timing of the selections of presidential
electors in the States (Article II, Section 1, clause 4).  Under this authority Congress
has legislated a uniform date for presidential electors to be chosen in the States, and
a uniform date for congressional elections across the country, which are to be on the
Tuesday immediately following the first Monday in November in the particular,
applicable even-numbered election years.  
In addition to the absence of an express constitutional direction, there is also no
federal law which currently provides express authority to “postpone” an election,
although the potential operation of federal statutes regarding vacancies and the
consequences of a State’s failure to select on the prescribed election day (see 2
U.S.C. § 8, and 3 U.S.C. § 2) might allow the States to hold subsequent elections in
“exigent” circumstances.  It would appear that under Congress’ express constitutional
authority over the timing of federal elections it could enact a federal law setting
conditions, times and dates for rescheduling of elections to federal offices in the
States in emergency or other exigent circumstances, and with the proper standards
and guidelines could delegate the execution and application of those provisions to
executive branch or State officials.
In addition to general contest, protest and challenge statutes whereby the results
of elections to federal office are initially adjudicated in the States, a handful of States
have provided in State law express authority to postpone or reschedule elections
within their jurisdictions based on certain emergency contingencies.  The States’
authority within the United States Constitution appears to be sufficient to enact
legislation to deal with emergency and exigent circumstances concerning federal
elections, as long as such laws do not conflict with federal law enacted under
Congress’ superceding constitutional authority.  Federal courts have thus generally
interpreted federal law to permit the States to reschedule elections to congressional
office when “exigent” circumstances have necessitated a postponement.  There may,
however, be different issues raised in the case of the election of presidential electors,
as the federal statute regarding the “failure to make a choice” on the prescribed
election day for presidential electors is different than that regarding congressional
elections.  This report will be updated as events warrant.
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Postponement and Rescheduling of
Elections to Federal Office
Because of the fear of possible terrorist attacks which could be directed at
election facilities or voters in the States just prior to or during the elections in a
presidential election year, attention has been directed at the possibility/authority to
postpone, cancel or reschedule an election for federal office.
Background
There is no provision in the United States Constitution which currently
authorizes in express language any federal official or institution to “postpone” an
election for federal office.  The Constitution expressly devolves upon the States the
primary authority to administer within their respective jurisdictions elections for
federal office, with a residual and superceding authority within the United States
Congress over most aspects of congressional elections (other than the place of
choosing Senators),1 and with express authority in Congress over at least the timing
of the selections of presidential electors in the States.2  As to the time set for holding
elections under this express constitutional authority, Congress has legislated,
originally in 1845, a uniform date for presidential electors to be chosen in the States,3
and in 1872, a uniform date for congressional elections across the country,4 which are
to be on the Tuesday immediately following the first Monday in November in the
particular, applicable even-numbered election years.
In addition to the absence of specific constitutional direction, there is also no
federal law which currently provides express authority to “postpone” an election,
although the potential operation of federal statutes regarding vacancies and the
consequences of a State’s failure to select on the prescribed election day may allow
the States to hold subsequent elections in “exigent” circumstances.  A handful of
States have provided in State law express authority to postpone or reschedule
elections within their jurisdictions based on certain emergency contingencies, and
others have provided general emergency provisions which might be applicable to
election situations.
As to potential disruptions on election day, particularly in regard to the
presidential election, some of the confused scenarios and proposed solutions appear
to stem from a common misconception of the presidential election as being in the
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5 Article I, Section 5, cl. 1.
6 Constitution, Amendment XII, amending Article II, Section 1, cl. 3. 
7 See generally, the Electoral Count Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 373, ch. 90, February 3, 1887; now
3 U.S.C. §§ 5 et seq.
8 3 U.S.C. § 5.
9 The Constitution does require that the date for the presidential electors to give their votes
for President and Vice President be on the same day (Article II, Section 1, clause 4), and
Congress has set that time for the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December
next following the November election.  3 U.S.C. § 7.
nature of a national referendum.  The presidential election, however, is in reality a
series of State (and District of Columbia) elections for presidential electors from that
State (or jurisdiction) that the Congress has mandated, since 1845, to be held on the
same day throughout the country.  Consonant with the States’ authority over the
administration and procedural aspects of elections to federal office within their
jurisdictions, is the initial responsibility for resolving issues of challenges and
recounts in those elections.  This authority and these procedures may be relevant in
the case of disruptions, insurrection or violence at the polling places on election day
which could conceivably cast into question the efficacy and legitimacy of a particular
election result in that jurisdiction.
It should be emphasized that while the States have the initial authority, or the
“first cut” at resolving disputes and recounts in their respective jurisdictions
regarding elections to federal office, the Constitution expressly provides that the final
authority over the elections and returns of its own Members lies exclusively in each
House of Congress.5  As to the elections for presidential electors, the Constitution
expressly gives to the Congress the task of counting the electoral votes for President.6
Implicit within this explicit authority to count the electoral votes has been the
practical necessity to determine which electoral votes to count.  While Congress has
established procedures and rules for counting the electoral votes and resolving
disputed lists of electors,7 Congress has, by statute, specifically given the States a
“safe harbor” time within which to formally resolve presidential electoral disputes,
prior to the meeting of the Electoral College in December, which then would be
considered “conclusive” upon the Congress in counting those electoral votes for
President.8  
Timing of Federal Elections
The United States Constitution does not require a uniform election date in the
States for elections to the House or Senate, or for the selection of presidential
electors.9  Rather, this has been done by Congress by the enactment of federal law.
The Constitution, while declaring in the “Times, Places and Manner” clause
(Article I, Section 4, clause 1) that the States have the general authority over the
administration of even federal elections within their respective jurisdictions,
expressly provides that the Congress may supercede any State provision regarding,
among other things, the timing of congressional elections, and  further provides that
Congress may establish the time for the election of presidential electors in the States
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10 5 Stat. 721, Ch. 1, January 23, 1845; see now 3 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2.
11 Congressional Globe, 28th Cong., 2d Sess., at 350, March 6, 1844 (Mr. Duncan); see Levy
and Fisher, The Encyclopedia of the American Presidency, Volume 2, “Election,
Presidential, 1840,” at p. 446.
12 Congressional Globe, 28th Cong., 2d Sess., at 14, December 9, 1844 (Mr. Hale);
Congressional Globe, supra at 21, December 11, 1844 (Mr. Duncan); see 5 Stat. 721, Ch.
1, January 23, 1845, now 3 U.S.C. § 2.
13 17 Stat. 28, ch. 11, § 3, February 2, 1872, now 2 U.S.C. § 7.
14 Note discussion by Supreme Court in Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 73-74 (1967), and in
legislative history, Congressional Globe, 42 Cong., 2d Sess., at 141, December 14, 1871.
(Article II, Section 1, clause 4).  Under these authorities, Congress has established
uniform dates for the general elections to federal office within the States, which now
are mandated to be held on the first Tuesday next following the first Monday in
November in the appropriate even-numbered years.
It was not until 1845 that a uniform date for electing presidential electors in the
States was mandated by Congress.10  Before then, the timing for selecting presidential
electors could and did vary from State to State.  Congress in 1844 and 1845 was,
however, concerned about the allegations of fraud and corruption in the previous
election (1840) for electors for President and Vice President in several States.  It was
asserted that some of the particular misconduct in that election appeared to have been
encouraged, in part, because the States had differing dates for the presidential
election, which allowed the alleged movement of populations and voters to key States
having later elections (described as “pipelaying”).11  Congress sought to eliminate
such opportunities for fraud and corruption by establishing a uniform day throughout
the country for selecting the electors for President and Vice President, while assuring
that those States that required an absolute majority to elect could continue to hold a
run-off for presidential electors if needed in an election on a subsequent date.12
The uniform date for congressional elections in the States was not established
by the Congress until 1872.13  In first enacting this legislation, the Congress appeared
to be concerned primarily with two factors, that is, the potential undue and unfair
influence on elections in some States that earlier results and elections in other States
may routinely have; and the burden on voters who in some States would have to go
to the polls twice for two different general elections to choose federal officers in
presidential election years.14
Current Federal Authority to Postpone
As noted, the United States Constitution does not provide any express authority
to any federal official or institution to postpone an election for federal office in a
particular State, or in all of the States.  Specifically, there is no current constitutional
authority residing in the President of the United States, nor the executive branch of
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15 See discussion in CRS Report RL32471, Executive Branch Power to Postpone Elections,
by Kenneth R. Thomas.
16 See discussion of emergency powers generally, in CRS Report 98-505, National
Emergency Powers, by Harold C. Relyea.
17 Article II, Section 1, clause 2: “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors ....” 
18 Note discussion of historic uses of emergency powers and rule of necessity, particularly
the use of authority by President Lincoln in the Civil War era, in “Emergency Powers,” by
Harold C. Relyea, appearing in Separation of Powers - Documents and Commentary, Katy
J. Harriger, ed., pp. 80- 97 (2003).   There may also certainly be, of course, serious political
implications for a President to exercise inherent or implied “emergency” powers to affect
the timing, and thus possibly the turnout and outcome, of an election in which that President
himself is a candidate for re-election.
19 Article 1, Section 4, clause 1; Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 799, 832-833 (1995).
20 Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 544-545 (1934).
21  Article II, Section 1, clause 4.
22 Smiley v. Holm, supra at 366-367 [congressional elections]; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S.
651, 657-658 (1884) [congressional elections]; Burroughs and Cannon, supra [presidential
elections]; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13-14, see n.16 (1976) [presidential and
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Government, to postpone, cancel, or reschedule elections for federal office in the
various States.15  There might certainly be some potential emergency powers inherent
in the President of the United States, as well as those delegated by statute, but there
is no precedent for such powers being applied with respect to elections held in the
various States for presidential electors,16 authority over which, as to the procedures
and methods, has been expressly delegated in the Constitution to the States.17  It is
possible that some scenarios could be imagined, however, where attacks, disruptions
and destruction are so severe and so dangerous in certain localities, particularly in
crowded urban areas, that the President under a rule of necessity may look to protect
the public safety by federalizing State national guard and restricting movement and
activities in such areas which would obviously affect the ability to conduct an
election at those sites.18
Unlike the President, Congress does have explicit constitutional authority over
elections to federal office which is of an express, residual nature concerning
congressional elections,19 and a broad implicit authority recognized by the Supreme
Court to legislate to protect the integrity and proceedings of presidential elections,20
as well as express authority over the date of the selection of presidential electors.21
Congress could, therefore, pass legislation regarding dates, and emergency
postponements and/or rescheduling times for elections to federal offices.  The courts
have recognized an expansive authority in the Congress to “provide a complete code”
for federal elections within the States, including presidential elections, and, within
the parameters of the specific dates for the length and terms of federal offices
established within the Constitution, could exercise its legislative discretion with




23 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657-658 (1884).
24 Although Congress has the express constitutional authority over these aspects of federal
elections, Congress could delegate, with the appropriate standards, the authority to regulate
such elections to the executive branch, which would administer and execute the particular
federal laws enacted, such as it has done with respect to the conduct and regulation of the
financing of federal elections to the Federal Elections Commission, an executive agency.
Note generally, discussion in CRS Report RL32471, supra, of the required standards for
delegation as set out in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989); Skinner v. Mid-
American Pipeline, 490 U.S. 212 (1989); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 443-
444 (1998).
earlier in our history with regard to Congress’ authority over the conduct of elections
for federal office in the States:
That a government whose essential character is republican, whose executive
head and legislative body are both elective ... , has no power by appropriate laws
to secure this election from the influence of violence ... is a proposition so
startling as to arrest attention and demand the gravest consideration.
If this government is anything more than a mere aggregation of delegated
agents of other States and governments, each of which is superior to the general
government, it must have the power to protect the elections on which its
existence depends from violence and corruption.23
Furthermore, in theory, Congress could also enact a law delegating to the
executive certain authority in this area regarding emergency rescheduling.24
However, as a policy matter, and under Article I, Section 4, clause 1, and Article II,
Section 1, clause 2, Congress has traditionally allowed the States, within the
framework of the federal constitutional and statutory mandates, to exercise the
substantive control over the procedures and administrative details of elections within
their own respective jurisdictions, and the States have then generally further devolved
immediate administrative and supervisory control over many election procedures to
local and county authorities within their jurisdictions.  This policy has generally
recognized the principle that because of the varying political cultures, practices and
traditions across the nation, and from State-to-State, that operational authority over
most of the election mechanics is more efficiently left to the States and localities.
It should be noted, and as discussed in more detail in following sections, that
there are existing provisions under current federal law regarding a failure of a State
to make a selection on the prescribed election day with regard to both congressional
elections (2 U.S.C. § 8) and presidential elections (3 U.S.C. § 2), which have
traditionally left the details of such decisions up to the States.
State Authority Over Election Procedures and Administration
State Authority Under United States Constitution.
There is under our federal system of shared sovereignty a division of jurisdiction
and authority which occurs in the case of elections to federal office under the
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25 Powell v. McCormack,395 U.S. 486 (1969); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
779 (1995); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001). 
26 Article I, Section 4, cl. 1. 
27 Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997), citing to Storer v, Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730
(1974), and Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 24 (1972).
28 Article II, Section 1, clause 2.
29 The qualifications to vote in congressional elections in a particular State must be the same
as the qualifications to vote for the most populous House in the State legislature, and meet
other federal standards, such as age and absence of discrimination.  Note Article I, Section
2, clause 1; Article II, Section 1, clause 2; 14th, 15th, 17th, 19th, 24th and 26th Amendments.
30 Article I, Section 5, cl. 1.  In addition to judging the elections and returns of its own
Members, each House is expressly authorized to judge the “qualifications” for office of the
Members-elect in those elections, that is, the age, citizenship and inhabitancy in the State
of the Members-elect seeking to be seated.  Note Powell v. McCormack, supra.
31 Constitution, Amendment XII.
32 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).  Legitimate “ballot access” procedures, as well as
administrative requirements, reasonable filing deadlines, and party affiliation rules, are
generally considered within the State’s purview to “regulate[ ] election procedures” to serve
(continued...)
provisions of the United States Constitution.  In the first instance, the terms of federal
offices and the qualifications of candidates eligible for federal offices are established
and fixed by the agreement of the States within the instrument which created those
offices, that is, the United States Constitution, and are thus unalterable by the
Congress alone or by any State unilaterally.25  The Constitution expressly provides,
however, that the individual States have the authority to administer elections for
federal congressional office, while providing that Congress may generally supercede
any such regulations.26  The Supreme Court has described this “Times, Places and
Manner” clause of Article I, Section 4, as a “default provision; it invests the States
with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections ... but only so far as
Congress declines to pre-empt state legislative choices.”27  The State legislatures
have express authority over the “manner” in which presidential electors in their State
are to be chosen.28  Within certain constitutionally prescribed parameters, the States
are also responsible to establish the qualifications for voting in their States in federal
elections.29   Finally, as to its own Members, the Constitution provides that each
House of Congress expressly retains the authority to be the final judge of the results
of their elections and constitutionally prescribed qualifications,30 and the Congress,
in joint session, is assigned in the Constitution the duty to count the electoral votes
for President and to declare the winner.31
Under the States’ “Times, Places and Manner” authority in the Constitution, the
States may promulgate a broad range of regulatory and administrative provisions over
the mechanics and procedures even for federal elections within their States regarding
such things as forms of the ballots, “ballot access” by candidates (including new
party or independent candidates), voting procedures, and the nominating and electoral
process generally, to prevent election fraud, voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, the
proliferation of frivolous candidates, and to facilitate proper election administration.32
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32 (...continued)
the State interest of “protecting the integrity and regularity of the election process....,” and
are not considered impermissible additional qualifications for federal office.  See U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832-835 (1995), comparing legitimate “ballot access”
provisions as in Storer v. Brown, supra, with impermissible additional qualifications for
federal office, such as individual State-imposed term limits.  Requirements for “ballot
access,” in addition to the requirement that they impose no substantive, new qualifications
to federal office, must not violate equal protection provisions of the Constitution by
impermissibly discriminating against new or independent candidates, nor impermissibly
infringe upon First Amendment rights of voters to associate freely and express their political
opinions through support of their chosen candidates.  Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431
(1971); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972); Williams v. Tucker, 382 F. Supp. 381,
387-388 (M.D.Pa. 1974).
33 405 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1972).
34 Id. At 25-26.
35 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
The States’ procedural and administrative authority over elections within their
jurisdictions, including elections to federal office, includes the initial authority over
election contests, protests and recounts.  As noted by the Supreme Court in
Roudebush v. Hartke, even though the Constitution expressly gives each House of
Congress the final authority over the elections and returns of it own members (Article
I, Section 5), a State may adopt contest and recount provisions as one of the
“safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the
fundamental right involved.”33  The Court noted there:
Indiana has found, along with many other States, that one procedure
necessary to guard against irregularity and error in the tabulation of votes is the
availability of a recount. ...  A recount is an integral part of the Indiana electoral
process and is in the ambit of the broad powers delegated to the States by Art. I,
§ 4.
It is true that a State’s verification of the accuracy of election results
pursuant to its Art. I, § 4, powers is not totally separable from the Senate’s power
to judge elections and returns.  But a recount can be said to “usurp” the Senate’s
function only if it frustrates the Senate’s ability to make an independent final
judgment.  A recount does not prevent the Senate from independently evaluating
the election any more than the initial count does.  The Senate is free to accept or
reject the apparent winner in either count, and, if it chooses, to conduct its own
recount.34
As to the presidential election, the State legislatures are granted express
authority over the manner in which presidential electors are to be chosen.  Article II,
Section 1, clause 2.  Although there remains continued controversy over the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Bush v. Gore,35 where a federal court intervened to stop a State
ordered recount of the vote for presidential electors in Florida in 2000, the Court’s
per curium opinion left intact and affirmed, at least in theory, a State legislature’s
authority under the United States Constitution to enact protest or contest statutes and
provisions regarding elections for presidential electors, although the implementation
of that procedure as directed by the Florida courts was found by a majority of the
Supreme Court to be violative of the equal protections and due process requirements
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36 The Court found that “it is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance
with the requirements of equal protection and due process without substantial additional
work,” in formulating specific standards for and overseeing manual recounts, which would
necessitate that the proceedings would not be completed by the State statute’s deadline.
Bush v. Gore, supra at 110.
37 531 U.S. 70 (2000)
38 See CRS Report RS21942, State Election Laws: Overview of Statutes Regarding
Emergency Election Postponement Within The State, by L. Paige Whitaker.
of the United States Constitution.36  The primacy under the United States
Constitution of the States’ legislatures in establishing the mechanisms for
appointment of presidential electors and in fashioning recount and protest statutes
was also emphasized by the Supreme Court in the decision preceding Bush v. Gore,
that is, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,37 which had remanded back
to the State courts the issue of the recount proceedings in the Florida presidential
election of 2000.
Authority Under State Law to Postpone or Reschedule.
There are several State provisions which currently purport to give to certain
specified State officials the authority to “postpone” or to reschedule an election
within the State, prior to the holding of an election, for a number of emergency and
exigent circumstances.38  Furthermore, other States may have general emergency
powers which might be used, and might be broad enough, to allow the Governor or
other State executive official to take action which may effect a postponement of an
election.  Because of the increased awareness of the threat from terrorists and terrorist
organizations, State legislatures may in the future consider the adoption of additional
provisions which set out the considerations and circumstances for the declaration of
a postponement and/or rescheduling of an election within their jurisdiction, including
elections to federal offices.
Conformance With Federal Law.
Does a State law or order instituting a rescheduling of an election to federal
office within that State impermissibly affect the date of such election in
contravention of the federal laws that have established election day for federal offices
to be the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November?
 Congressional Elections.  The federally established date for elections for
federal office, while it is clearly mandatory and not merely advisory, may not
necessarily be an “absolute,” such that no election subsequent to that date could be
or should be recognized.  In fact, as noted, the federal statutory scheme in the case
of congressional elections specifically provides for the contingency of a “vacancy”
in the State delegation, whether that vacancy is caused by death, resignation or
incapacity, or by a “failure to elect at the time prescribed by law,” by authorizing
another time for the election to be prescribed by State law:
2 U.S.C. § 8.  Vacancies  The time for holding elections in any State,
District, or Territory for a Representative or Delegate to fill a vacancy, whether
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39 Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997).
40 Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Bomer, 199 F.3rd 773 (5th Cir. 2000); Millsaps v.
Thompson, 96 F.Supp.2d 720 (E.D.Tenn. 2000).
41 Busbee v. Smith, 549 F.Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983); Public
Citizen, Inc. v. Miller, 813 F. Supp. 821, 830 (N.D.Ga. 1993), aff’d, 992 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir.
1993).
42 Busbee v. Smith, supra at 525.
such vacancy is caused by a failure to elect at the time prescribed by law, or by
the death, resignation, or incapacity of a person elected, may be prescribed by the
laws of the several States and Territories respectively.
The Supreme Court of the United States has found that the day established in
2 U.S.C. § 7 for electing Senators and Representatives in the States is a mandatory
date, and that a State’s statutory scheme may not permissibly allow the “election” of
such a federal official at an election held prior to the first Tuesday after the first
Monday in November date.  Thus, the Louisiana election provisions which
designated as “elected” to Congress an open primary winner who received at least a
majority of the votes cast in that primary election held prior to the general election,
was found to be a violation of the federal law setting the general election date.39
States that allow “early voting” in federal elections, however, have not been found
by federal courts to be holding a prior election in violation of the federal statute since
it was found that the election would not be “consummated” before election day, or
that such ballots would not be officially counted or tallied before election day.40
Federal courts interpreting the federal statutes regarding the timing of elections
to Congress have noted that the States’ scheme for elections must be in general
conformance with the date prescribed by federal law, at 2 U.S.C. § 7, and may not
routinely allow the election on an earlier date, but that certain “exigent”
circumstances may permit the holding of an election for federal office at a subsequent
time under 2 U.S.C. § 8.41  The Federal court in the District of Columbia in Busbee
v. Smith, in a case affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, found that an
exigent circumstance, such as the State of Georgia’s reapportionment plan being
refused preclearance by the Justice Department under the Voting Rights Act of 1965
because of “discriminatory effects,” allowed for an election to federal office in two
congressional districts to be held on a subsequent date:
...[W]here exigent circumstances arising prior to or on the date established by [2
U.S.C.] section 7 preclude holding an election on that date, a state may postpone
the election until the earliest practicable date.  In this case, for example, Georgia
will “fail[ ] to elect at the time prescribed by law” because its purposefully
discriminatory conduct prevented it from securing Section 5 approval for
constitutionally required changes in its voting procedures.  As a result, we
believe, that [2 U.S.C.] section 8 permits a reasonable postponement of the
elections in the Fourth and Fifth Congressional Districts.42
This  reasoning, as noted later by another federal court, would allow for the
postponement of an election, and the holding of the election for federal office in the
State at a later date, for a number of possible “exigent” circumstances, including
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43 Public Citizen, Inc. v. Miller, 813 F. Supp. 821, 830 (N.D.Ga. 1993), aff’d, 992 F.2d 1548
(11th Cir. 1993).
“natural disasters” such as hurricanes, tied votes, or fraud.  This federal court in
Georgia found that the State’s statutory requirement that a candidate to be elected
receive a majority, and not merely a plurality, of votes in the general election, was
such an exigent circumstance that could require the holding of a subsequent run-off
election for Senator to be held on November 24, after the earlier November general
election mandated by 2 U.S.C. § 7 resulted in no candidate receiving a majority of
the votes:
The court in Busbee acknowledged that 2 U.S.C. § 8 allows States, under
certain circumstances, to hold elections at times other than those prescribed by
section 7.  Id. at 524-25.  In addition to the circumstances it specifically
enumerates — death, resignation, personal incapacity — section 8 allows states
to reschedule elections “where exigent circumstances arising prior to or on the
date established by section 7 preclude holding an election on that date.”  Id. at
525.  The court offered natural disasters, and the parties to the instant suit offer
fraud and a tie vote as examples of ‘exigent’ circumstances warranting state
rescheduling.43
Elections for Presidential Electors. The election for presidential
electors presents somewhat different issues than those elections for congressional
office, as the language of the federal statutes for presidential electors varies from the
language governing congressional elections.  The statute concerning the timing and
scheduling for congressional elections provides expressly that when there is a
vacancy caused by death, resignation or incapacity, or when “such vacancy is caused
by a failure to elect at the time prescribed by law,” then a subsequent election may
be scheduled.  This language appears to be broad enough and, as noted above, has
been interpreted by federal courts to actually permit a temporary postponement and
rescheduling of a congressional election.  The federal statute for presidential
elections, however, expressly states that “[w]henever any State has held an election
for the purpose of choosing electors,” but fails to “make a choice on the day
prescribed by law,” then the electors may be selected on a subsequent day in the
manner established by the legislature of the State:
3 U.S.C. § 2.  Failure to make choice on prescribed day  Whenever any
State has held an election for the purpose of choosing electors, and has failed to
make a choice on the day prescribed by law, the electors may be appointed on a
subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of such State may direct.
Does the wording of 3 U.S.C. § 2 mean that the authority of the States to
reschedule an election for presidential electors is contingent upon the State actually
having “held an election for the purpose of choosing electors”?  If so, then under this
theory no prior postponement and rescheduling would be permitted State-wide, even
a postponement for natural disasters such as an impending hurricane, or the
destruction shortly prior to the elections of a number of polling places, since it would
conflict with the federally scheduled time in 3 U.S.C. § 2.
CRS-11
44 Congressional Globe, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. at 14, December 9, 1844 (Rep. Hale of New
Hampshire); see amendment at Congressional Globe, supra at 21, December 11, 1844 (Mr.
Duncan); note also debate at  Congressional Globe, supra at 30-31, December 13, 1844.
45 Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, supra 76-77; Bush v. Gore, supra 104-
105; see specifically McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
46 Foster v. Love, supra at 72.
Certainly, if a scheduled election is being held when terrorist or other types of
attacks are conducted on voting places, destroying certain polling places in various
precincts and disrupting the election generally in a State, then the power of the State
to find under its general election contest and challenge procedures that the results of
the election, because of such disruptions, are not viable or valid, and that, either a
new election, or a continuation of the election (whereby those people who were not
certified by election officials as having already voted could come to vote at a
subsequent time), would appear to be in conformance with federal law, both at 2
U.S.C. § 8 (for congressional elections), as well as 3 U.S.C. § 2, in the case of the
election of presidential electors.  In such cases, the State had clearly “held an
election,” but a choice was not necessarily made because the State has determined
that the results could not fairly be ascertained.
However, if there is a disruption just prior to an election, could an election for
presidential electors not be held, that is, be postponed and rescheduled in a particular
State and still be in conformance with 3 U.S.C. § 2?  There is no clear and definitive
authority on this question, nor do there appear to be specific legal precedents bearing
upon this issue.  Even though the purpose in 1845 of this particular provision at 3
U.S.C. § 2, regarding the subsequent choosing of electors, was clearly to allow those
States that required an absolute “majority” in a general election to be “elected” to
hold a subsequent run-off election if no candidate’s electors received such a
majority,44 the language itself may be open to broader interpretation.
It may be contended on the one hand, that the express constitutional authority
of the State legislatures over the selection of presidential electors at Article II,
Section 1, clause 2, which language allows the State legislatures to enact statutory
schemes to protect the validity of their elections for presidential electors in the State,
including fashioning protest or contest procedures, may be consonant with such an
authority in the legislature itself to temporarily postpone or to authorize by State law
the postponement and rescheduling of State-wide elections by the State executive in
certain emergency circumstances.  One of the major points made by the Supreme
Court in both the earlier Palm Beach County case, and the latter Bush v. Gore
decision, was the primacy of the state legislatures’ role in the manner of the selection
of presidential electors.45  Although clearly the concepts of “time” and “manner” of
election are not necessarily synonymous,46 this constitutional provision and the
Supreme Court’s deference to the State legislatures may arguably give some
credibility to the States’ attempts to statutorily prescribe a system whereby
emergency procedures may be implemented with respect to all State-wide elections,
including the general elections for federal office, which provide that such elections,
while certainly scheduled for the federally prescribed date, because of such
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emergency and exigent circumstances need to be rescheduled, postponed or
continued at a subsequent time.
Furthermore, it may be noted that in addition to Article II, Section 1, clause 2
of the Constitution, the federal law at 3 U.S.C. § 5, which was part of the original
Electoral Vote Count Act of 1887, provides the State legislatures with further
statutory authority to finally and conclusively resolve within the State protests,
challenges and contests of the election of presidential electors.  One of the purposes
of the original 1887 statute regarding counting of the electoral votes was to
substantially devolve upon the States the burden for resolving conflicts over the
election, selection and appointment of those states’ own electors for President and
Vice President.47  As noted by the Supreme Court, this statute at 3 U.S.C. § 5:
... creates a “safe harbor” for a State insofar as congressional consideration of its
electoral votes are concerned.  If the state legislature has provided for final
determination of contests or controversies by a law made prior to election day,
that determination shall be conclusive if made at least six days prior to said time
of meeting of the electors.48
Clearly, there is an understanding that the States were intended to have the principal
and initial responsibility for resolving the conflicts, arguments, controversies and
difficulties involved in the processes of electing presidential electors. 
Thus, it is possible to argue that to harmonize the provisions for elections to
federal office, that is specifically the provisions for subsequent congressional
elections at 2 U.S.C. § 8 and the presidential provisions at 3 U.S.C. § 2, along with
the authority devolved upon the States in 3 U.S.C. § 5, that it would be logical to read
the federal statutes as permitting a postponement and an election on a subsequent
date for both Congress and presidential electors under the State’s current laws when
necessitated by emergency and exigent circumstances in the particular State and, as
long as the matter is resolved in time, such resolution would be conclusive on
Congress in counting the presidential electoral votes.  Such a supposition might be
bolstered somewhat by the alternative, that is, that the federal law could work to
disenfranchise the voters of a particular State when that State believes it is necessary
to temporarily postpone the regularly scheduled State-wide elections because of some
extraordinary and disastrous event in the State.
While providing possible support for the State legislature’s authority to develop
a scheme which could include postponement of elections for presidential electors in
times of emergency, this argument of expanded State authority might not necessarily
give any additional weight to an implied or inherent authority of the State Executive
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or the State courts to do so, absent an express delegation in law from the legislature.49
Finally, as a policy matter there has been some consternation over allowing any
State to postpone or otherwise reschedule an election for federal office.  The grounds
for any such postponement or rescheduling, as well as any express, implied or
inherent authority, would have to be examined initially under State law and
procedure, and no blanket statement could be made with respect to the interpretation
in all of the States.  Furthermore, there appears to be little legal or factual precedent
to apply to such circumstances.  Remembering that the presidential election is not
necessarily in the nature of a national referendum, but is rather 51 simultaneous
State/District elections for presidential electors, however, it may be asked as a matter
of policy whether or not an event that occurred earlier in the State, or an event that
occurs in a different State, would or should be enough to trigger a postponement of
an election in any particular State as a matter of good public policy.  It has been
argued that a violent disruption of an election in Manhattan, New York City, should
not necessarily affect, or at least could not predictably affect, an election in
Manhattan, Kansas.  Various commentators have noted that on the fateful day of
September 11, 2001, despite the events unfolding in Manhattan in New York City,
Pennsylvania, and in Arlington, Virginia, a primary election for federal congressional
office, a contested congressional primary, on the South Shore of Massachusetts
reportedly drew a larger than normal number of the voting age population.50
Problems and disruptions in one State may not necessarily or predictably affect the
viability of the results in another.
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Appendix: Constitutional and Federal Statutory Provisions
Congressional Elections.
Article I, Section 2, clause 1.  The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second year by the people of the several
States ....
Article I, Section 2, clause 4.  When vacancies happen in the
Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs
of Election to fill such Vacancies.
Amendment Seventeen.  The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years ....
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the
executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such
vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the
executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the
vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
Article I, Section 4, clause 1.  The times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter
such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
Article I, Section 5, clause 1.  Each house shall be the Judge of the
Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members ....
Presidential Elections.
Article II, Section 1.  The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America.  He shall hold his Office during the Term of
four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be
elected, as follows:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress ....51
Article II, Section 1, clause 4.  The Congress may determine the Time of
chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their votes; which
Day shall be the same throughout the United States.
Amendment XII.  The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and
vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, ... and they shall make distinct
lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-
President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and
certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States,
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directed to the President of the Senate; — The President of the Senate shall, in
the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates
and the votes shall then be counted ....
Dates of Federal Office Terms.
Amendment XX, Section 1.  The terms of the President and Vice President
shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and
Representatives at noon on the 3rd day of January, of the years in which such
terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their
successors shall then begin.
Current Federal Statutory Provisions.
2 U.S.C. § 1.  Time for election of Senators  At the regular election held
in any State next preceding the expiration of the term for which any Senator was
elected to represent such State in Congress, at which election a Representative
to Congress is regularly by law to be chosen, a United States Senator from said
State shall be elected by the people thereof for the term commencing on the 3d
day of January next thereafter.
2 U.S.C. § 7.  Time of election  The Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in
November, in every even numbered year, is established as the day for the
election, in each of the States and Territories of the United States, of
Representatives and Delegates to the Congress commencing on the 3d day of
January next thereafter. 
2 U.S.C. § 8.  Vacancies  The time for holding elections in any State,
District, or Territory for a Representative or Delegate to fill a vacancy, whether
such vacancy is caused by a failure to elect at the time prescribed by law, or by
the death, resignation, or incapacity of a person elected, may be prescribed by the
laws of the several States and Territories respectively.
3 U.S.C. § 1.  Time of appointing electors  The electors of President and
Vice President shall be appointed, in each State, on the Tuesday next after the
first Monday in November, in every fourth year succeeding every election of a
President and Vice President.
3 U.S.C. § 2.  Failure to make choice on prescribed day  Whenever any
State has held an election for the purpose of choosing electors, and has failed to
make a choice on the day prescribed by law, the electors may be appointed on a
subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of such State may direct.
3 U.S.C. § 5.  Determination of controversy as to appointment of
electors  If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed
for the appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy
or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State,
by judicial or other methods or procedures, and such determination shall have
been made at least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors,
such determination made pursuant to such law so existing on said day, and made
at least six days prior to said time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive,
and shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes as provided in the
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Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the
electors appointed by such State is concerned.
